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Abstract 
 
 This article evaluates the employment and welfare effects of increased trade competition 
and protection in economies with wage dualism, unemployment, and on-the-job search. A micro-
based measure of economy welfare distinguishes between workers and other sectors of the 
economy is developed to deal with labor market imperfections and distributional issues. For 
example, increased competition in high-wage sector goods reduces high-wage employment, but 
may or may not increase overall unemployment. Policy may be chosen to mitigate loss in worker 
earnings that are partly or wholly offset by gains to consumers of the importable. 
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 Trade competition affects US workers, both in the structure of their job opportunities and 
in the prices they pay as consumers. To determine how the impact of trade competition would 
change under alternative policies, a formal analytical framework is needed. The goals of this 
study are to develop a theoretical model that incorporates key aspects of international trade 
conditions and regimes as well as important features of the functioning of the US labor market. 
 As is well known, standard international trade theory asserts that free international trade 
is welfare-improving for both trading partners; or put differently, the absence of international 
trade can never yield higher welfare for either country. But the limitations of the standard 
argument are also well known. Free international trade often leads to unemployment and 
consequent welfare losses. The traditional literature assumes full employment. Not only is this 
assumption inconsistent with the facts — it also fails to consider the effects of various policy 
measures in situations in which the consequences of unemployment are a major consideration in 
deciding which policy is most appropriate. 
 In this article, we analyze the employment and welfare effects of trade using a labor 
market model that is more sophisticated than the labor market models used in trade theory to 
date. This model allows for three sectors and different wages in each, thereby incorporating wage 
diversity, unemployment and underemployment, on-the-job search, and job mobility — all of 
which must be considered in any analysis of the labor market effects of trade. 
 The labor market model and its solution are described in the second and third sections. 
The fourth and fifth sections use this model to analyze the labor market and welfare economic 
consequences of trade competition in the absence of policy intervention and with trade 
protection. The final section offers conclusions. 
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THE LABOR MARKET MODEL 
 
The Need for Wage Dualism, Unemployment, and On-the-job Search 
 
 The question we address in this article is what effects import competition would have on 
US workers under alternative trade policies. Many studies do as we do in defining import 
competition as an additional supply of foreign goods that lowers the price of a domestically 
produced good. The treatment of labor markets differs among authors, however. 
 In one group of models, the authors have sought to describe the effects of trade in the 
presence of persistent unemployment caused by an economy-wide minimum wage. Among the 
major contributions in this literature are those of H. G. Johnson [20] and Richard Brecher [5] 
(see J. N. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan [3, Chapter 22] for a summary). By assuming an 
economy-wide minimum wage, these authors assume the labor market to be homogeneous; there 
is no distinction between high-wage and low-wage sectors of the economy. 
 In another group of models, wage dualism exists. Among the models with this feature are 
those of James Cassing and Jack Ochs [7], E. J. Ray [26], Erling Steigum [27], R. E. Baldwin 
[1], and F. G. Barry [2]. However, in these models, the treatment of unemployment is less than 
satisfactory. Baldwin has no unemployment at all; he supposes that all workers displaced from 
one sector due to import competition take up employment in the other. In Cassing and Ochs’s, 
Ray’s, and Steigum’s models, unemployment is found, but only in the short run; in the long run, 
the labor market adjusts so that all workers are employed in one sector or the other. Barry 
specifies work-sharing among all those in the high wage sector. Thus, while there may be 
unemployed labor hours in his model, there are no unemployed people. In all these articles, by 
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having unemployment not persist in equilibrium, the authors treat the labor market as more 
flexible than it is. 
 Yet other models of import competition have neither wage dualism nor unemployment in 
equilibrium. Among the models in this category are those by H. E. Lapan [21], D. O. Parsons 
[25], Michael Bruno [6], Peter Neary [24], B. A. Forster and Ray Rees [12], and Harry Flam, 
Torsten Persson, and L. E. O. Svensson [11]. 
 We see all of the preceding models as useful up to a point, yet not fully consistent with 
certain basic empirical facts about employment and wages in the United States. One is that 
certain labor markets tend to have persistently higher wages than others for comparable workers 
(E. A. Hanushek [17]). This suggests that wage rigidity rather than market-clearing wages may 
typify certain segments of the labor market. Another is the finding of R. E. Hall [16] that high-
wage labor markets are characterized by high unemployment rates. Hall and others interpret this 
pattern as reflecting the influx of job-seekers in pursuit of jobs in high- paying industries or 
localities. And finally, an important feature of the US labor market, as noted, for instance, by J. 
R Matilla [22], is the prevalence of on-the-job search in many industries and occupations. 
 An analytical framework consistent with the first two of these observations was put forth 
by John Harris and Michael Todaro [19]. Tax-subsidy policy in a Harris-Todaro-type economy 
was analyzed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan [4]. G. S. Fields added on-the-job search and a third 
sector to the Harris- Todar model [8] and distinguished between workers’ ex ante choices among 
job search strategies and the ex post allocation of the labor force among labor market outcomes 
[10]. A modified version of Fields’s model forms the basis for our analysis of trade competition. 
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The Formal Model 
 
 The model developed here is atemporal. The economy consists of a large number of 
homogeneous, risk-neutral individuals and a small number of economic sectors.1 Primary 
attention is given to the supply side of the labor market. The production side of the model is 
specified only to the extent that it is necessary for the formulation of the labor market model. The 
various sectors differ from one another in three major respects: wages, job search opportunities, 
and the impact of trade competition. 
 The highest-paying sector is named “the high-wage sector” and is denoted by 𝐻. It is this 
sector that is affected by trade competition. The wage in this sector, 𝑤𝐻, is set by some 
combination of market and/or institutional forces, above market-clearing levels and higher than 
the wage elsewhere in the economy. All workers, being risk-neutral income-maximizers, aspire 
to jobs in the high-wage sector. They may elect to search for these jobs by being openly 
unemployed and searching full-time (assuming for simplicity that there is no unemployment 
compensation) or by accepting low-wage employment elsewhere in the economy at a positive 
wage and searching part-time. Two such low-wage sectors are assumed to exist. One of them, 
termed “the low-wage sector,” is assumed to be located some distance from the high-wage 
sector. Because of this distance, and because workers in the low-wage sector are occupied with 
their jobs for some number of hours each day, low-wage workers would probably face reduced 
job search prospects compared with their searching chances if full-time in the high-wage area. 
However, the wage in the low-wage sector, 𝑤𝐿, exceeds the wage if unemployed (0). The other 
economic sector, termed “free-entry sector,” is assumed to be located in the same place as the 
high- wage sector. The wage paid there is 𝑤𝐹. Workers may end up employed in one of these 
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three sectors or else unemployed. Thus:  𝐸𝐻 = employed in high-wage job in the given location 
at wage 𝑤𝐻; 𝐸𝐹 = employed in free-entry job in that same location at wage 𝑤𝐹; 𝐸𝐿 = employed 
in low-wage job in another location at wage 𝑤𝐿; 𝑈 = unemployed. It is supposed that 𝑤𝐻 >
𝑤𝐹 > 0 and 𝑤𝐻 > 𝑤𝐿 > 0. 
 To search for high-wage jobs, three search strategies are possible: 
 
1. Search While Openly Unemployed in the High-Wage Location 
 
 This is the search strategy specified in the models of Harris and Todaro [19], A. C. 
Harberger [18], Jacob Mincer [23], E. M. Gramlich [13], and J. E. Stiglitz [28] among others. 
Those who adopt Search Strategy [1] begin unemployed and search full-time. Each such worker 
faces the same probability of obtaining a job in the high-wage sector; 𝜋 is specified further later. 
Those who are successful become employed at wage 𝑤𝐻, while those who are unsuccessful end 
up unemployed and earn 0. 
 
2. Search from a Free-Entry Sector Job 
 
 It is quite common for those working in low-paying sectors of the economy to have a 
nonzero chance of finding jobs in the high-paying sectors of their economies. For instance, those 
who take jobs at fast food restaurants may search for better-paying jobs at night and on 
weekends, hear of jobs through friends and relatives already at work, or secure a position 
through an employment agency or labor exchange. 
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 To allow for the possibility of on-the-job search by workers in low-paying activities, we 
formulate a model in which each person not in the high- wage sector has a positive, but reduced, 
change of finding a job there.2 
 Denote the relative efficiency of on-the-job search while employed in the free-entry 
sector as compared with search while unemployed by 𝜓, which is best thought of as a relative 
job search parameter. Suppose 𝜓 were equal to 1 2⁄ . This would mean that any given job 
searcher has only half as good a chance of obtaining a high-wage job if he or she is working in a 
free-entry sector job when compared with the chance he or she would have were he or she 
searching full time. 
 
3. Search from a Low-Wage Job to Another Location 
 
 This is defined analogously to the situation facing those searching while in free-entry 
sector jobs. On-the-job search is possible, but it is less efficient than full-time search. 
Analogously, therefore, think of job search being possible while employed in the low-wage 
sector and denote the relative job search parameter by Θ. On-the-job search prospects are 
assumed to be better for workers in the free-entry sector than for low-wage workers in other 
locations, because the former are in closer proximity to the high- wage jobs than the latter. 
Therefore, the model is restricted so that Θ ≤ 𝜓. 
 Workers are assumed to choose among alternative search strategies on the basis of the 
expected value of income associated with each. These are given by: 
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Search 
Strategy 
Relative Search 
Efficiency 
If Successful, 
Earn 
If Unsuccessful, 
Earn 
[1] 1 𝑤𝐻 0 
[2] 𝜓 𝑤𝐻 𝑤𝐹 
[3] Θ 𝑤𝐻 𝑤𝐿 
 
The associated expected values are denoted by 𝑉. The respective values are: 
 
 
 The expression for 𝑉[1] requires no explanation. The expressions for 𝑉[2] and 𝑉[3] each 
consist of two terms. Take the expression for 𝑉[2]. The first term, 𝑤𝐻𝜓𝜋 is the wage in the high-
wage sector multiplied by the probability of obtaining a job at that wage given that the individual 
has elected Search Strategy [2]. That probability is the probability 𝜋 associated with full-time 
search multiplied by the relative search parameter 𝜓 applicable to an individual who accepts a 
reduced search opportunity while working in the free-entry sector in the same location as the 
high-wage jobs. The product 𝜓𝜋 is then the probability of successfully obtaining a high-wage 
job while working in the free-entry sector. In the event that this search is unsuccessful, which 
occurs with probability (1 − 𝜓𝜋), those who adopt this search strategy end up remaining in the 
free-entry sector and earning  𝑤𝐹. 𝑉[2] then consists of the wages in the two sectors weighted by 
the respective probabilities of receiving them under Search Strategy [2]. The expression for 𝑉[3] 
above is derived analogously. 
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 Let us turn our attention to the probability of employment, 𝜋, defined as the ratio of high-
wage jobs 𝐸𝐻 to job-seeker-equivalents (defined later) 𝐽𝐻: 
 
Of course, the amount of employment in the high-wage sector, 𝐸𝐻, is a function of the wage in 
that sector, determined by the profit-maximizing behavior of firms in the high-wage industry; it 
may be written as 
 
where ℎ(𝑤𝐻 𝑝𝐻⁄ ) is the usual labor demand function. 𝐽𝐻 is the number of “job-seeker 
equivalents” and has the following interpretation. Denoting the number of workers electing each 
search strategy by 𝐿𝑖, 𝑖 = [1], [2], [3], each of the 𝐿[1] workers has a full chance of obtaining any 
given job, each of the 𝐿[2] workers has Θ of a chance. If each job-seeker is weighted according to 
the relative chance of obtaining a job, then the number of job-seeker equivalents is: 
 
The adding-up constraint can be examined to verify that on the assumption that high-wage sector 
jobs are filled in exact proportion to the number of job-seeker equivalents, this formulation 
indeed yields just the right amount of employment. 
 Next, we specify the wage determination process. As already stated, the wage in the high-
wage sector 𝑤𝐻 is determined exogenously above market-clearing levels. This may occur for a 
number of possible reasons including minimum wages, trade unions, or firms deliberately setting 
the wage above market-clearing levels for efficiency wage reasons. The wages in the other two 
sectors, the free-entry sector and the low-wage sector, are functions of their respective labor 
forces. Certainly, we wish these functions not to be increasing. They may either be constant or 
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decreasing. The wage being invariant with respect to the size of that sector’s labor force would 
be relevant, for example, when the number of workers moving into or out of a sector is small 
relative to the number already there. A decreasing wage as a function of the size of the labor 
force would be consistent with the wage equaling a diminishing marginal product of labor or 
with a situation of 0 marginal product of labor and income-sharing among all those working in a 
given sector. Some special cases will be dealt with later. But at this point, it is useful to stick to 
the general wage functions 
 
 A bit of explanation may be in order regarding the sizes of the labor force in the different 
sectors. 𝐸𝐿 and 𝐸𝐹 in Equations (7) and (8) are the numbers of workers who ultimately end up in 
the low-wage sector and the free-entry sector, respectively. These numbers are not the same as 
the numbers initially electing Search Strategies [2] and [3]. Take, for instance, those who chose 
on-the-job search from the free-entry sector. Of those persons (𝐿[2] in number), the fraction who 
successfully obtain free-entry employment is 𝜓𝜋; only (1 − 𝜓𝜋) percent are left in the low-wage 
sector. Hence: 
 
and 
 
The adding-up conditions for the labor force are, ex ante, 
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and ex post 
 
 Finally, we must have the rule specifying the allocation of the labor force between search 
strategies and sectors. If the solution is interior, meaning that all three search strategies have the 
same expected value, then 
 
For the solution in fact to lie in the interior, the parameters of the model must be restricted to 
take on certain values. For instance, suppose it were the case that on-the-job search is as efficient 
as search while unemployed, that is, 𝜓 = 1. Then 𝑉[3] would dominate 𝑉[1] for any possible 
allocation of the labor force among search strategies. Because nobody would choose search 
strategy [1], there would be no unemployment, only underemployment in that case. Such corner 
equilibria are interesting but not germane to the points we wish to make later. Accordingly, we 
shall assume that the parameters are such that the solution in fact lies in the interior. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE LABOR MARKET MODEL 
 
 The model given in the second section can be solved as follows. Once the wage 
Equations (7) and (8) are specified, the ex ante allocation of the labor force among search 
strategies (that is, 𝑉[1], 𝑉[2], and 𝑉[3]) may be derived by substituting the other ex ante relations in 
the model (Equations 1-6) and the adding-up conditions (Equations 12 and 13) into Equilibrium 
Condition (14). Then, given 𝐿[1], 𝐿[2], and 𝐿[3] and using (9) and (10), we may derive the ex post 
allocations of the labor force among various types of employment and unemployment (𝐸𝐻, 𝐸𝐹, 
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𝐸𝐿, and 𝑈). This gives an initial set of values, from which the effects of trade competition may be 
calculated. 
 It is inconsistent with an interior allocation for all wages to be fixed outside the model.3 
At least one of them must vary with the allocation of the labor force. We proceed by 
endogenizing the free-entry sector wage, allowing it to vary with the size of the free-entry sector 
labor force. As stated earlier, we take the wage in the high-wage jobs as given, determined, 
perhaps, by union wage practices or other forces. We also take the price and wage in the low-
wage sector as invariant with respect to the size of that sector’s labor force. This may be justified 
by assuming that in the relevant range, the trade-affected sector is small relative to the rest of the 
economy, so that the price and wage elsewhere do not change appreciably if labor enters or 
leaves that sector. 
 We consider two alternative ways of endogenizing the free-entry sector wage: 
 
 In this case, the total income generated in the free-entry sector is fixed at some amount 
𝑄𝐹. (This assumption, made here for simplicity, is relaxed later.) The available income is shared 
equally among the 𝐸𝐹 workers in the free-entry sector. The model given by Equations (1)—(14) 
with (8.i) substituted in place of the general function (8) may be solved to yield the following 
equations.4 
 For the ex ante allocation of the labor force among search strategies: 
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For the ex post allocation of the labor force among employment in the various states and 
unemployment: 
 
 The effects of trade competition may be found by performing comparative statics on 
(15.i) - (21.i) with respect to 𝐸𝐻 (which is changed by the drop in 𝑃𝐻 due to trade competition). 
We find, for the ex ante allocation: 
 
For the ex post allocation, we have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 One effect may come as a surprise to the reader: trade competition in this case is found to 
lower unemployment when the new equilibrium is reduced. This happens because when the 
number of high-wage jobs is reduced, the payoff to the highly risky, search-while-unemployed 
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strategy is reduced. Therefore, fewer workers devote full-time to trying to get high-wage jobs. 
Instead, these workers are more willing to settle for jobs in lower-paying sectors of the economy 
and search for high-wage jobs only part-time. The result of such revised search behavior is that 
more workers search for high-wage jobs while employed in low-wage jobs, and unemployment 
falls as a consequence. 
 How robust are these results? We proceed now to: 
 
 In this case, the income generated in the free-entry sector depends on the number of 
workers in that geographic location. The 𝐸𝐻 workers employed in the high-wage sector are 
assumed to spend $𝛼 on free-entry- sector goods. Free-entry-sector workers themselves are 
assumed to spend $𝛽 on the goods produced in their sector. As in case (i), the income generated 
in the free-entry sector is assumed to be shared equally among free-entry sector workers. Hence, 
the free-entry sector wage in case (ii) is given by 𝑤𝐹 = (𝛼𝐸𝐻 + 𝛽𝐸𝐹) 𝐸𝐹⁄ . 
 Proceeding as before, the ex ante and ex post allocations of the labor force may be 
derived by substituting (8.ii) into the rest of the model, as follows: 
 For the ex ante allocation of the labor force, 
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where 𝐸𝐹 is endogenous and is given later. For the ex post allocation of the labor force among 
employment in the various states and unemployment, 
 
 
 Performing comparative statics on (15.ii) - (20.ii) with respect to 𝐸𝐻: For the ex post 
allocation, we have
 
whenever parameter values are such that the solution is interior; 
 
Proofs of the signs of these two expressions appear in the Appendix. 
 A number of these results differ from those derived in case (i). In particular, the 
ambiguity of the unemployment effect in case (ii) may come as a surprise, given the 
unambiguous result in case (i). The reason for this ambiguity in case (ii) is the following. When 
employment in the high-wage sector falls, the payoff for searching while unemployed falls. As in 
case (i), this effect by itself would tend to lower the number of unemployed. But unlike case (i), 
a second effect is present; the loss of high-wage jobs implies that the demand for free-entry-
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sector output falls, which in turn results in less income to be shared among workers in that 
sector. This effect by itself reduces the attractiveness of the free-entry sector, causing the number 
willing to risk unemployment to increase. Depending on parameter values, unemployment can 
either increase or decrease in response to trade competition, reflecting the relative strength of 
these two effects. 
 Table 1 shows the summing up of our findings on the effects of trade competition on the 
equilibrium allocation of the labor force in the two special cases. We, thus, find that when the 
labor force reallocates itself among sectors in response to trade competition, the model predicts 
that the equilibrium will be characterized by the movement of workers from high-wage jobs into 
low-wage jobs and, for many parameter values, not into unemployment. Of course, in the short 
run, trade competition may cause unemployment, but this is not likely to persist indefinitely. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 
WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE COMPETITION: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 In what follows, we shall develop from trade and labor market fundamentals a formula 
for evaluating the welfare effects of trade competition. Our analysis, based on dual functions, 
goes beyond traditional analysis in two directions. First, since unemployment constrains 
worker/consumers in addition to their budget constraint, the dual forms must be modified to take 
into account the value of the nonbudget constraints. Second, we provide the welfare measure in a 
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form that can be applied either on a sector-by-sector or on an individual basis and that can be 
aggregated to a consistent economy-wide measure. 
 Consider a worker with conventional utility function 𝑢(𝑥), which is quasi-concave, 
increasing and continuous in 𝑥 = (𝑥𝐻 , 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝐿 , −𝐸𝐻, −𝐸𝐹 , −𝐸𝐿), the available consumption goods 
being denoted by 𝑥𝑘, 𝑘 = 𝐻, 𝐹, 𝐿 and the supply of labor by 𝐸𝑘 (denoted with negative signs by 
convention). People work less than 24 hours per day, because their utility is assumed to approach 
negative infinity as the number of hours of work approach the total available hours of the 
worker. The positive signs on 𝑥𝐻, 𝑥𝐹 , and 𝑥𝐿 mean that these goods confer utility, whereas the 
negative signs on 𝐸𝐻 , 𝐸𝐹 , and 𝐸𝐿 mean that the worker loses utility by having to work. The 
worker’s primal problem is to maximize utility by choice of 𝑥𝐻, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝐿 , 𝐸𝐻 , 𝐸𝐹 , and 𝐸𝐿 subject to 
the budget constraint
 
where 𝐽 is the nonlabor income of the worker, and 𝑘 = 𝐻, 𝐸, 𝐿 denotes the type of employment 
of the worker. The choices for labor are 𝐸𝑘 = 1 if the worker works, and 𝐸𝑘 = 0 if the worker is 
unemployed. If the worker has no nonlabor income, then 𝐽 = 0. We shall denote the maximum 
possible utility level arising from this problem by 𝑢∗. 
 The conventional dual to this problem is to minimize the expenditure needed to attain 
utility level 𝑢∗.5 This dual problem is represented by 
 
𝑒(∙) gives the minimum expenditure needed to reach utility level 𝑢∗ when 𝑝 =
(𝑝𝐻, 𝑝𝐹, 𝑝𝐿; 𝑤𝐻, 𝑤𝐹, 𝑤𝐿). From duality theory, we know that given prices p, the optimal choices 
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𝑥∗ corresponding to the utility level 𝑢∗ are the same in the primal and the dual problems. We 
shall work with the dual problem in what follows. 
 We shall assume that the disutility of work is a function only of the amount of work and 
not of the type of job in which the worker is employed. From this, it follows that a worker whose 
labor market choices are unconstrained would always prefer working in the highest-wage job 
open to him or her. This sector is the high-wage sector with wage 𝑤𝐻. 
 If high wage jobs were open to all workers, the problem given by (29.a) would apply to 
everyone. However, the labor market we have described is one in which high-wage jobs are not 
available for all workers. Take the case of a worker who does not get a job in the high-wage 
sector. Such a worker would be constrained to the next-best labor market alternative. Write this 
constraint as 𝑔(𝑥) ≥ 0, wherein the 𝐸𝐻 component of the 𝑥 vector is constrained to equal 0. 
Given this constraint, the worker’s constrained expenditure function is given by 
 
Note that because the previous utility level 𝑢∗ is no longer attainable, a different (and lower) 
optimal utility level 𝑢′ appears instead. 
 Corresponding to the worker’s constrained expenditure, there exists a corresponding 
notion of income. Suppose that the worker has a certain fixed amount of nonlabor income, 𝐽. 
Then the amount of purchasing power available to be spent on consumption goods is 𝑤𝑘𝐸𝑘 + 𝐽, 
where 𝐸𝑘 is the labor supply of the worker. The worker’s expenditure, however, includes 
“purchases” of leisure at level −𝐸𝑘. Writing the budget constraint, 𝑝𝐻𝑥𝐻 + 𝑝𝐹𝑥𝐹 + 𝑝𝐿𝑥𝐿 −
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𝑤𝑘𝐸𝑘 = 𝐽 shows that 𝐽 is the appropriate measure of income corresponding to the constrained 
expenditure function. 
 Since ?̂?(𝑝,∙), given prices 𝑝, is a monotonic function of utility, 
?̂?(𝑝, 𝑢(𝑥𝐻, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝐿 , −𝐸𝐻, −𝐸𝐹 , −𝐸𝐿)) is also a utility function with different (but internally 
consistent) labelings of the indifference curves. The use of ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑢) as the utility function simply 
relabels indifference curves by the amount of money needed to achieve that welfare level at 
prices 𝑝. Now let us suppose that we are comparing the worker’s welfare in two situations 
labeled “0” and “1.” The change in welfare (∆𝑊) for the worker is given by 
 
We choose prices equal to those that prevail in one of the two situations (without loss of 
generality let this be situation 1 so that 𝑝 ≡ 𝑝𝑖).
6 Since ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑢′) is the amount of nonlabor income 
needed to achieve utility level 𝑢′ when prices are 𝑝, this describes the situation actually faced by 
the consumer when his nonlabor income was 𝐽. Thus ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑢′) = 𝐽 and the change in welfare is 
given by 
 
 To apply this measure to the economy as a whole, we need to determine how the utilities 
of different individuals in the economy are affected. As wage-earners, workers are affected by 
trade competition, because the structure of earning opportunities changes. As consumers, 
workers are affected by trade competition, because they pay lower prices for the trade- affected 
good 𝑥𝐻. Also affected by trade competition are firms, shares of which are owned by persons. 
Workers are affected by this to the extent that they own shares in firms, directly or indirectly. 
Equation (30), when weighted by the changing numbers of workers in each group and the 
welfare changes within each, determines the overall welfare consequences of import competition 
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on workers. Summing (30) over workers means that an additional dollar of welfare to any worker 
is treated as equally socially valuable. Firms’ welfare is given by total profit defined in the usual 
way. 
 In our analysis of the welfare effects of trade competition on workers, we assume that 
workers receive no income from government transfers or from the ownership of firms. Under 
these assumptions (30) can be written using the individual worker’s budget constraint to show 
the separate channels of welfare influence discussed earlier, 
 
where 𝑧0
𝑖  is the vector (𝑥𝐻
𝑖 , 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 , 𝑥𝐿
𝑖 , 0, −𝐸𝑘, 0), showing the worker’s economic dealings with the 
rest of the economy (−𝐸𝑘 denotes the worker’s supply of labor in the appropriate category 𝑘 =
𝐻, 𝐹, or 𝐿).7 As indicated underneath, the three terms represent the “price,” “income,” and 
“substitution” effects of trade competition on the worker’s welfare. 
 Consider price effects first. If 𝑝𝐻 falls, the corresponding component of −(𝑝1 − 𝑝0) is 
positive. Since good 𝐻 is a good purchased by the worker, 𝑥𝐻 > 0 also. Thus the 𝐻 component 
of −(𝑝1 − 𝑝0) ∙ 𝑧0
𝑖  is positive, a welfare increase. This is true also for goods 𝐹 and𝐿. On the 
labor-supply side, if 𝑤𝑘 falls, the corresponding component of −(𝑝1 − 𝑝0) is positive. But since 
−𝐸𝑘 is negative, a falling wage indicates welfare loss for the worker (something he sells has a 
lower price). The net effect of all of the price changes on welfare is given by −(𝑝1 − 𝑝0) ∙ 𝑧0
𝑖 . 
 Term 𝐼 represents the income effects of the employment constraints on the worker. It is 
the amount of money the worker would be willing to pay to have the constraints removed. If 
there are no constraints, for example, 𝑒𝑖(∙) = ?̂?𝑖(∙) then term 𝐼 is 0. In general, however, it 
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equals lost labor income less the utility value of the increased leisure due to reduced work time 
from the constraint. In the special case in which leisure does not have utility value, then term 𝐼 is 
just lost income from the labor supply constraint. 
 Term 𝑆 is the savings to the consumer from choosing a mixture of goods different from 
𝑥0 to achieve utility level 𝑢0 at prices 𝑝1. For small changes in prices, or if the consumer has no 
willingness to substitute, term 𝑆 is 0. A Taylor approximation to 𝑆 shows that all terms are of 
second or higher order in price changes. 
 
WELFARE ANALYSIS8 
 
Absence of Government Intervention 
 
 Let us denote the situation before trade competition by subscript 0 and the situation after 
trade competition by subscript 1. Trade competition changes the prices facing worker 𝑖, and 
possibly his or her employment or wage as well. The effect of trade competition is to change 
worker 𝑖’s utility from ?̂?𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑢0
𝑖 ) to ?̂?𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑢1
𝑖 ). To get to the change in welfare for all workers 
and the entire economy, we sum (31) over workers and account for the effects of trade 
competition on firm profits and income to the nonlabor sector. The effects of this summation are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
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 In deriving Table 2 we have assumed that the utility value of additional leisure to workers 
who are unemployed, or who are employed at a job that is not their first choice, is 0. The two 
new terms in Table 2 that have not appeared before are 𝑝1 ∙ (𝑦1 − 𝑦0), which is the change in 
firm net revenues at prices 𝑝1 after subtracting out labor costs (that is, return to nonlabor factors), 
and (𝑇1 − 𝑇0), which is the change in income transfers to the economy. By assumption, workers 
do not receive transfers so 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 is assigned to nonworkers. 
 Several simplifications to the components of Table 2 occur for small changes. First, the 
substitution effects go to 0. This has already been noted for terms of the form 𝑝1 ∙ 𝑥0
𝑖 −
?̂?𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑢0
𝑖 ). To see it for 𝑝1 ∙ (𝑦1 − 𝑦0) note that 𝑝1 ∙ (𝑦1 − 𝑦0) approaches 𝑝 ∙ 𝑑𝑦 for small 
changes. The wage-equal- to-marginal-product hiring condition for labor, 
 
is equivalent to 
 
The second simplification occurs by combining the wage-related terms of −𝑑𝑝 ∙ 𝑧0 with the 
corresponding terms 𝑑[𝑤𝑘𝐸𝑘] of the laborers’ income effects.
9 The resulting welfare effects for 
small changes are given next. Economy welfare changes for small changes: 
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 Using 𝑑𝑊 to denote change in economy welfare and substituting from (25.1)—(27.i) into 
(32) gives,11 
 
if case (i) applies, where 
 
is the elasticity of high-wage employment with respect to the real wage (see Equation (5)) and 
 
if case (ii) applies. In case (i) consumers of good 𝐻 gain welfare by the drop in price of good 𝐻, 
while high-wage workers lose welfare from their loss of high-wage employment. Looking just at 
employment and earnings effects, unemployed workers as a group gain just enough to balance 
the losses of the high-wage workers since a portion of their number end up being employed in 
the low-wage sector. That is, from (26.i) and (27.i), 
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The net effect for the economy, therefore, is a welfare gain equal to the consumption gain given 
by 
𝑝𝐻𝑧𝐻
𝜂𝐻
𝑑𝐻𝐸𝐻
𝐸𝐻
> 0. In case (ii) the effect of trade competition could be to raise unemployment so 
that the net effect on welfare is ambiguous. Aggregate welfare could rise or fall according to 
(33.ii).12 
 In summary, the disaggregated and aggregated effects of trade competition on economy 
welfare in the absence of tariff or government intervention are given in Table 3. By the use of the 
term “disaggregated” we mean that we have separated the component welfare effects on the 
worker depending on his or her role as a consumer and as an employee. In each of the two cases 
the effect of trade competition is to harm workers in the high-wage sector while helping 
consumers in the country as a whole. In case (i) the net effect of trade competition on the 
earnings of all labor is neutral; but because labor as a whole benefits by paying lower prices as 
consumers, welfare increases. In case (ii) earnings may increase or decrease, and so the effect of 
trade competition on aggregate welfare is ambiguous. 
 We now turn to the effects of trade competition in the presence of active tariff policy. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
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Effects of Government Intervention 
 
 Since the impact of trade competition operates in the form of reduced prices for the 
import-competing good, it is feasible to insulate the domestic economy partially or wholly from 
changes by the imposition of a countervailing tariff or quota. Any benefit to the country from 
such restrictions on world trade is due to induced improvements in the terms of trade plus its 
effect on reducing or eliminating labor market consequences of trade competition. 
 Let 𝑡 be the tariff (that is, 𝑡 − 1 is the ad valorem tariff rate), 𝑇 be tariff revenue, ∈𝐼 the 
total price elasticity of domestic import demand for good 𝐻, and 𝐾 a shift parameter representing 
the level of trade competition.13 
Then 𝑇 =
𝑡−1
𝑡
𝑝𝐻𝑧𝐻(𝑝𝐻) Writing the expression for welfare change (32) 
when the economy responds to trade competition by raising the level of the protective tariff on 
the import-competing good gives the following, 
 
where 
 
For a tariff, or its quota equivalent, 
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where superscript 𝐼 refers to the home country and 𝐼𝐼 to the rest of the world, 𝜖𝑆
𝐼𝐼 is the total price 
elasticity of foreign supply of good 𝐻, and 𝛾 is the marginal propensity to consume 
importables.15 Employment changes are determined by the elasticity of demand for labor in the 
high-wage industry, 
 
Four options are particularly relevant in discussing the response of the home country to increased 
trade competition: 
• Laissez-faire 
 The welfare and distributional effects of doing nothing have already been discussed. 
 
• Fixing the domestic price 𝑝𝐻 
 By choosing the tariff or quota to hold domestic price 𝑝𝐻 constant as the world price 𝑝𝑊
𝐻  
falls, it is always possible to insure welfare gains equal to the value of increased tariff revenues, 
 
provided that the rest of the world does not retaliate with tariffs of its own. Under this option, 
consumers benefit not from lower prices but by receiving their pro rata share of tariff revenues. 
• Choosing the tariff on Imports of 𝐻 to maximize domestic welfare 
 This is not really a viable option in the context of the world trading community. It 
requires using the tariff to influence the world terms of trade in favor of the home country as in 
the conventional optimal tariff argument. As such, it is an option that is always available 
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independently of trade competition. At the optimum, the tariff is determined by the condition that 
𝑑𝑊 𝑑𝑡⁄  equal 0. 
• “Voluntary” Export Restraint to hold imports of 𝐻 constant at original levels 
 If instead of a tariff or domestically administered quota, a “voluntary” export restraint is 
negotiated, then any resulting revenues accrue to foreign suppliers and the term for 𝑑𝑇 drops out 
of (32). Other options can be evaluated using (32).  
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SUMMARY 
 
 We have described a framework for analyzing the labor market consequences of 
increased trade competition on US workers and its impact on the welfare of the country. The 
model allows for on-the-job search, unemployment, and underemployment. Using this 
framework we have derived the domestic-welfare consequences of a reduction in the price for 
the import-competing good due to increased trade competition. 
 The main labor market results are summarized in Table 1. Trade competition in the high-
wage sector reduces the number of workers employed in high-wage jobs. In response, some of 
these workers will seek out low-wage jobs elsewhere in the economy. Workers may or may not 
leave free-entry sector jobs located near the high-wage jobs, depending on the nature of demand 
in that sector. Unemployment may rise or fall, also depending on the particular parameters of the 
model. Thus, after the economy has had time to adjust, trade competition does not necessarily 
increase unemployment; very possibly unemployment might fall. 
 The welfare effects of trade competition in the absence of government intervention are 
summarized in Table 3. Apart from employment effects, all who purchase the high-wage good 
are better off when its price falls. Offsetting this, though, is the loss of high-wage employment. 
Workers as a whole may suffer a total loss of earnings. Aggregate welfare may increase or 
decrease as a result of trade competition, depending on the sizes of these offsetting effects. 
 The aggregate welfare effects of trade competition with government intervention were 
derived in the last section. In the absence of foreign retaliation, the country can always raise total 
welfare by a judicious choice of tariff that neutralizes the effect of trade competition. Thus, our 
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analysis leads to the conclusion that rather than prohibiting trade competition through quotas or 
through “voluntary” export restraints, the country might do better to impose a tariff. 
 These welfare effects rely for their validity on the use of total welfare as the reference 
measure. Distributionally sensitive welfare functions might well yield different results, especially 
if workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily than the rest of the economy’s. Since we have 
disaggregated the welfare effects, the preceding analysis could also serve as a starting place for 
discussion of constituency-sensitive issues in providing trade protection. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proof that 
𝝏𝑬𝑳
𝝏𝑬𝑯
< 𝟎: 
 In the expression for 
𝜕𝐸𝐿
𝜕𝐸𝐻
 in the text, note that 𝑤𝐻 𝑤𝐿⁄ > 0 and the bracketed term is 
comprised of only positive terms. Taking account of the minus signs in front of each, we thus 
have the sum of two negative terms, so the result is clearly negative. 
 
Proof that 
𝝏𝑼 >
𝝏𝑬𝑯 <
𝟎: 
 Start with the expression for 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
 in the text. To show that this expression is of ambiguous 
sign, it must be shown that both positive and negative signs are possible for particular parameter 
values: 
(a) Demonstration of possibility that 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
> 0: 
 
Combining these yields 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
=
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
− 1, which is positive for 𝑤𝐻 > 𝑤𝐿. 
(b) Demonstration of possibility that 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
< 0: 
 
 
Given 𝑤𝐻 > 𝑤𝐿 > 0 and 0 ≤ 𝜓 < 1, it follows that 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
 for all 𝜓 > 0.5. 
(c) The ambiguity of 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸𝐻
 follows from (a) and (b). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Change in Welfare Terms If the Import-Competing Good and Import Goods are Imperfect 
Substitutes 
 
 Minor modifications of the analysis are needed if the import-competing good 𝐻 and the 
import good 𝐻′ are imperfect substitutes. Instead of the vector 𝑥 in the fifth section, the extended 
vector 
𝑥′ = (𝑥′𝐻 , 𝑥𝐻, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥ℎ, −𝐸𝐿 , −𝐸𝐹 , −𝐸𝐻) 
should be used. The corresponding net trade vector becomes 
𝑧′ = (𝑧′𝐻, 𝑧𝐻, 𝑧𝐿), 
indicating that cross-hauling of goods 𝐻 and 𝐻′ is possible. Equation (34) (or (38)) becomes, 
and the prime indicates variables relating to good 𝐻′. Implementation of policy requires 
information on 
𝜕𝑝𝐻
𝜕𝑝𝐻′
=
𝜕𝑝𝐻
𝜕𝑥𝐻
𝜕𝑥𝐻
𝜕𝑝′𝐻
 
which depends on the cross-price elasticity of domestic demand for good 𝐻 with respect to 𝑝′𝐻 
in the obvious way. 
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NOTES 
 
 This work was financed in part by the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US 
Department of Labor. The authors are grateful to Clint Shiells for helpful comments. 
1. Heterogeneity of labor adds additional complexity that is not warranted at this point. 
Future work could examine the implications of allowing workers to differ in terms of 
seniority, specific human capital, and other characteristics that would create differential 
probabilities of getting and/or keeping high-wage jobs. 
2. Unlike those job-search models in which searchers have discretion over the amount of 
searching they will engage in and, hence, the margin of interest is the intensive margin 
(how intensively to search on the job), the formulation here treats the amount of on-the-
job search as parametric, so the action takes place on the extensive margin (that is, how 
many engage in on-the-job search rather than search while unemployed). 
3. In such a case, it may be shown that one search strategy will always be dominated by the 
other two. 
4. Derivations are available from the authors upon request. 
5. Because the worker loses utility by having to work, the expenditure to be minimized is 
“full expenditure,” taking account both of the expenditure of money on goods and of the 
expenditure of effort to earn income. 
6. It is important not to confuse the measure Δ𝑊 with equivalent variation. Δ𝑊 differs from 
equivalent variation in two respects. First, equivalent variation makes use of 
unconstrained expenditure 𝑒(𝑝1, 𝑢) rather than the ?̂?(𝑝1, 𝑢) used in Δ𝑊 and, second, Δ𝑊 
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is an exact measure of utility in dollar terms, whereas equivalent variation measures 
consumer surplus: 
Δ𝑊 ≡ ?̂?(𝑝1, 𝑢1) − ?̂?(𝑝1, 𝑢0); 
𝐸𝑉 ≡ ?̂?(𝑝1, 𝑢1) − ?̂?(𝑝0, 𝑢1). 
7. By construction of ?̂? we have, 
?̂?(𝑝1, 𝑢1) = 𝑝1 ∙ 𝑥1 
?̂?(𝑝0, 𝑢0) = 𝑝0 ∙ 𝑥0 
But since the worker has no nonlabor income, 𝑥0 = 𝑧0 and the left-hand side of both 
terms above is 0. (31) follows by direct substitution. 
8. In this and the following section we assume that the high-wage good and import good are 
perfect substitutes. Appendix B discusses the case of imperfect substitutes. 
9.  
 
 
 
 where (𝑧0)𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻, 𝐹, 𝐿 is the 𝑘th component of 𝑧0. 
10. With full employment 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑤𝐹 = 𝑤𝐿, and 
𝑑𝐸𝐻 + 𝑑𝐸𝐿 + 𝑑𝐸𝐹 = 0 
The simple form of the distortion term in (32) comes from the assumption of equal 
disutility of all labor and the fact that workers are at corner solutions in their labor market 
choice of how much labor to supply. Otherwise utility-related terms would appear in (32) 
replacing the terms in 𝑑𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻, 𝐹, 𝐿. 
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11. By (25.i) - (27.i) 
Since 𝑧𝐹 = 0 (it is not an internationally traded good), 𝑑𝑝𝐿 = 0 by choice of 𝑝𝐿 as 
numeraire, and by assumption tariffs are 0 (𝑑𝑇 = 0), welfare is determined by 𝑧𝐻𝑑𝑝𝐻, 
which varies with 𝑑𝐸𝐻 according to (5). 
12. Suppose 𝛽 = 𝜃 = 𝛼 − 𝑤𝐹 = 0. Then (33.ii) reduces to 𝑑𝑊 =
𝑝𝐻𝑧𝐻
𝜂𝐻𝐸𝐻
𝑑𝐸𝐻 +
𝑤𝐹[𝐸𝐹 − 𝐸𝐻]
𝑑𝐸𝐻
𝐸𝐻
. If imports are small (𝑧𝐻 small), then the sign of 𝑑𝑊 is dependent Eh 
on the sign of 𝐸𝐹 − 𝐸𝐻, which can be positive or negative. 
13. Heretofore, 𝑝𝐻 (hence 𝐸𝐻) has represented the level of trade competition. Since policy in 
this section is chosen to influence 𝑝𝐻 (hence 𝐸𝐻), we need to distinguish the underlying 
level of trade competition, indexed by 𝐾, from 𝑝𝐻. For example, 𝐾 can be thought of as a 
parameter that shifts the foreign supply of the imported good. In the absence of a policy 
response to trade competition, 𝑝𝐻 is a function of 𝐾 alone, and 𝑝𝐻, 𝐾, and 𝐸𝐻 move 
monotonically relative to each other. If policy responds to trade competition, then 𝑝𝐻 is a 
function of 𝐾 and 𝑡. 
14.  𝑑𝑝𝐿 = 0 by choice of numeraire good, 𝑧𝐹 = 0 since good 𝐹 is not traded. Equation (34) 
follows from (32) by noting that 
15. If foreign supply is perfectly elastic at the world price 𝑝𝐻
𝑤 then ∈𝑆
𝑙𝑙→ ∞ and 
𝜕𝑝𝐻
𝜕𝑡
→
𝑝𝐻
𝑡
. 
Since ∈𝑆
𝑙𝑙=∈𝑙𝑙− 1, Equation (36) could also be written in terms of the rest of the world’s 
elasticity of import demand (see [3, p. 382]). 
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